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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY), FR, UR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BACKGROUND
PAPERS: FRENCH PERCEPTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY: FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD EAST-WEST
RELATIONS SINCE DE GAULLE HAVE BEEN BASED ON A STRONG
SENSE OF INDEPENDENCE, A CHAUVINISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD
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FRANCE'S PLACE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, A DETERMINED
PURSUIT OF FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND THE COMPLEX-
ITIES OF INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS. UNDER GISCARD, THE
DESIRE TO ASSERT FRENCH INDEPENDENCE HAS MELLOWED TO
THE POINT WHERE THE FRENCH ARE NOW MORE COOPERATIVE ON
EAST-WEST MATTERS THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE
DE GAULLE. GISCARD HAS BEGUN TO FACE UP TO THE LIMITS

ON DETENTE, AND THIS HAS BROUGHT FRENCH PERCEPTIONS CLOSER TO OUR OWN AND CREATED OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFLUENCING FRENCH THINKING. NEVERTHELESS, THE FRENCH REMAIN COMMITTED TO AN INDEPENDENT POLICY OF DETENTE, AND THEIR BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE TO LIMIT THEIR COOPERATION WITH US ON RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. FRENCH ARMS CONTROL POLICY IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT WILL BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM. END SUMMARY.

2. FRENCH ROLE IN EUROPE. WHILE THE FRENCH OF COURSE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC WESTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC, THEY HAVE SINCE DE GAULLE ALSO THOUGHT IN TERMS OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE "FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS": A EUROPE WHICH INCLUDES THE USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST STATES BUT DOES NOT BY DEFINITION INCLUDE THE US. IN SUCH A EUROPE, THE US HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY AS A POWERFUL ALLY WHOSE MILITARY STRENGTH BALANCES THAT OF THE USSR. BUT THE US IS NOT SEEN AS A "PERMANENT" EUROPEAN STATE, OR AS HAVING ALL THE RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF THE EUROPEANS THEMSELVES. FRANCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS CENTRAL TO SUCH A EUROPE, BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY AND ITS PRESENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY STATUS. THE FRENCH SEE THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN THE US, AS THE

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CUSTODIAN AND AGENT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN RELATION TO THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE.

3. REJECTION OF BLOCS AND US DOMINANCE. BUILDING ON THIS BASIC CONCEPT OF THEIR OWN PLACE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE FRENCH HAVE REJECTED TO A LARGE EXTENT THE USEFULNESS OF DEALING WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE AS PART OF A WESTERN "BLOC". PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A BLOC MEANT BEING OVERSHADOWED BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IN FACT, THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF THE US ROLE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS SINCE YALTA. THEIR NATIONALISM OBLIGES THEM TO REJECT US HEGEMONY IN ANY FORM, AND THEY ARE FEARFUL OF A US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM WHICH WOULD DOMINATE EUROPE. THIS FEAR, COMBINED WITH THEIR VIEW THAT THE US HAS NO PERMANENT PLACE IN EUROPE, CONTRIBUTES TO FRENCH EFFORTS TO ASSERT THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. ONE OF THE ORIGINAL FRENCH RESERVATIONS ABOUT AGREEING TO PERIODIC BELGRADE-STYLE CSCE MEETINGS WAS THEIR CONCERN THAT THIS WOULD INSTITUTIONALIZE A US ROLE IN "ALL-EUROPEAN" AS WELL AS ATLANTIC AFFAIRS. IN FACT, THEY WERE PROBABLY MORE WORRIED ABOUT THIS EVEN

THAN THE SOVIETS. IN ADDITION, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT
EMPHASIZING INDEPENDENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WILL

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ENCOURAGE THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ACT MORE
INDEPENDENTLY THEMSELVES OVER THE LONG TERM. THE
FRENCH HAVE THUS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS A NATION
WITH INDEPENDENT FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES, WHILE
MAINTAINING A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FIRM
PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL TIES WITH WESTERN
INSTITUTIONS.

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4. LONG-TERM PROCESS. THE FRENCH SEE THE EVOLUTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS A LONG PROCESS, TO BE MEASURED IN TERMS OF DECADES. THEY BELIEVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR CAN BE INFLUENCED ONLY THROUGH PATIENT ENCOURAGEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LINKS WITH THE WEST. MOREOVER, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE US IS INCAPABLE OF PURSUING A LONG TERM POLICY REQUIRING DELICACY AND PATIENCE. WHAT ROLAND FAURE RECENTLY CALLED THE "SHOCKING AGGRESSIVITY" OF US INITIATIVES IS BOUND, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, TO PROVOKE THE SOVIETS. FOR THE FRENCH, A KEY ASPECT OF THE LONG-TERM PROCESS IS THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. THEY HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN OFFERING BOTH CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS AND TO FAVORED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, (I.E. POLAND AND HUNGARY). WHILE THEY ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE INDEBTEDNESS OF THE EASTERN NATIONS, THEIR OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MAKE IT NECESSARY TO DEVELOP MARKETS ABROAD, AND THEY CONTINUE TO DO THIS ENERGETICALLY IN THE EAST.

5. INTERNAL IMPLICATIONS. SINCE DE GAULLE, AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS A SINE QUA NON OF FRENCH POLITICAL LIFE. MAINTENANCE OF A "BALANCE" BETWEEN RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ON THE ONE HAND AND DETENTE WITH THE USSR AND THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE ON THE OTHER ATTRACTS VOTERS AT BOTH ENDS OF THE FRENCH POLITICAL SPECTRUM. SUCH A "BALANCE" APPEALS TO LEFT-LEANING VOTERS WHO SEE IT AS RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE PLACE WHICH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS HAVE OBTAINED IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; IT APPEALS TO RIGHT-WING VOTERS BECAUSE OF THEIR NATIONALISTIC DESIRE TO ASSERT THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US; AND IT APPEALS ACROSS
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THE WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM BECAUSE IT GIVES FRANCE WEIGHT IN THE WORLD. RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE USSR, HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY USED BY FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERS TO ASSERT THIS "BALANCE", WITH NOTABLE SUCCESS. IN FACT, FRENCH GOVERNMENTS OVER THE PAST DECADE HAVE REGULARLY SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE WITH COMMUNIST, PARTICULARLY SOVIET, DESIRES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE GOOD RELATIONS FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BENEFITTED POLITICALLY WITHIN THE FRENCH POLITICAL

CONTEXT.

6. EVOLUTION OF POLICY UNDER GISCARD. FRENCH ADHERENCE TO THE GENERAL APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE REMAINS STRONG, AND IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE IN ANY FUNDAMENTAL WAY. NEVERTHELESS, UNDER THE GISCARD GOVERNMENT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION IN THE FRENCH STANCE ON CERTAIN ISSUES, AND IN GENERAL A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE WHICH HAS PERMITTED A GREATER DEGREE OF ACCOMMODATION WITH THE POSITIONS OF FRANCE'S ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE US. THIS EVOLUTION HAS BEEN DUE TO GISCARD'S PERSONAL INCLINATIONS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. LIKE OTHER WESTERN LEADERS, GISCARD HAS FOUND THAT AFTER THE EARLY PRODUCTIVE YEARS OF DETENTE, THERE ARE LIMITS ON WHAT FURTHER JOINT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN WITH THE SOVIETS WITHOUT COMPROMISING WESTERN PRINCIPLES OR CONCRETE NATIONAL INTERESTS. GISCARD HAS BEGUN THE SOBERING PROCESS OF DEFINING THESE LIMITS WHILE SEEKING NEVERTHELESS TO FIND AREAS WHERE DETENTE CAN MOVE AHEAD.

7. THIS NEW ATTITUDE HAS COINCIDED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SET OF POLITICAL FACTORS WITHIN FRANCE WHICH MAKES IT MORE ELECTORALLY ACCEPTABLE, AND POSSIBLY EVEN ATTRACTIVE, TO TAKE A LESS STRIDENT STANCE IN
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DIFFERENTIATING THE POSITIONS OF FRANCE FROM THOSE OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE US. THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF THIS SITUATION IS GISCARD'S CONCLUSION THAT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE A USEFUL FACTOR IN THE FRENCH ELECTION CAMPAIGN NOW GETTING UNDER WAY; THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE CASE A FEW

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YEARS AGO.

8. IN FACT, THE FRENCH ARE MORE COOPERATIVE NOW THAN
THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE DE GAULLE, AND THIS
APPLIES ALSO TO THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EAST. PERHAPS
THE MOST DRAMATIC PRACTICAL REFLECTION OF PRESENT
FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THEIR ALLIES
-- AND US -- ON EAST-WEST ISSUES WAS THEIR PROPOSAL,
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SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED INTO A MAJOR US INITIATIVE AT
THE LONDON SUMMIT, THAT THE ALLIES CONDUCT WITHIN NATO
A BASIC REVIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE FACT THAT
THE FRENCH HAVE CONTRIBUTED ACTIVELY TO THIS EFFORT
IS A MARKED TURN-AROUND FROM THEIR PAST ATTITUDE, AND
OFFERS US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE FRENCH AT
THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO A COMMONLY SHARED ALLIED PERCEPTION
OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. WE
CAN TAKE SATISFACTION FROM THE EVOLUTION WHICH GISCARD
HAS BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE FRENCH VIEW OF EAST-WEST
RELATIONS, AND USE IT CAREFULLY TO WED THE FRENCH TO A
PERCEPTION WHICH IS MORE COMPLETELY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR
OWN. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE

THAT THERE ARE LIMITS ON HOW FAR THE FRENCH ATTITUDE CAN CHANGE. THESE LIMITS ARE DEFINED BY THE CONCEPTS WHICH UNDERLIE FRENCH EASTERN POLICY, AND WHICH ARE ROOTED IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION.

9. DETENTE. FRENCHMEN HAVE DEFINED DETENTE AS A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN COLD WAR AND A COMPLETE HARMONY OF VIEWS. IT IS CLEAR FROM FRENCH PRACTICE OVER THE YEARS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO MAKE PRACTICAL CONCESSIONS TO ACHIEVE A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP, BUT THAT THEY ALSO EXPECT PROPORTIONATE BENEFITS -- EITHER PRACTICAL OR POLITICAL -- IN RETURN. UNDER GISCARD, THE MARGIN FOR CONCESSIONS HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY NARROW, AND THOSE WHICH MIGHT BE MADE ARE CORRESPONDINGLY MORE VALUABLE. GISCARD HAS FELT OBLIGED TO SET A HIGH PRICE FOR THEM -- AN IDEOLOGICAL PRICE. IN HIS MEETING LAST JUNE WITH BREZHNEV, GISCARD SAID THAT DETENTE SHOULD MEET FOUR MAJOR CONDITIONS: (1) MODERATION OF IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION; (2) RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; (3) NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS; AND (4) WORLDWIDE

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APPLICATION. ALTHOUGH OUR OWN TOP PRIORITIES MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT, THESE ARE OBJECTIVES WITH WHICH MOST WESTERN STATESMEN WOULD AGREE. FOR THE SOVIETS, , HOWEVER, THEY INCLUDE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS, AND CLEARLY DEFINE A MORE LIMITED CONCEPTION OF DETENTE AND ITS POSSIBILITIES THAN THE FRENCH HAD FOLLOWED PREVIOUSLY. THE FRENCH SHARE OUR VIEW THAT DETENTE IS INDIVISIBLE AND THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT EXPECT IT TO ADVANCE IN EUROPE IF THEY DO NOT EXERCISE RESTRAINT ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD; FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO UNITA DURING THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR REFLECTED THIS CONCEPT.

10. IDEOLOGICAL DETENTE. GISCARD FIRST BROUGHT UP THIS ILL-CONCEIVED, ILL-DEFINED, AND CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPT WITH BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW IN 1975. THE FRENCH VIEW IS THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO WAGE PROPAGANDA WARFARE AGAINST THE WEST WITHIN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES WHILE EXCLUDING WESTERN INFORMATION EFFORTS IN THE USSR. THE FRENCH CONCLUDE THAT THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIS IMPLIES WESTERN CONTROL OVER THE MASS MEDIA AND CONFLICTS WITH THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF FREE CIRCULATION OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO FRENCH APPROACHES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE SUSPECT THAT THE GOF, REALIZING THAT "IDEOLOGICAL DETENTE" IS NOT A PARTICULARLY SALEABLE ITEM EITHER IN THE CSCE CONTEXT OR EVEN WITH FRENCH VOTERS, WILL

CONTINUE TO DOWNGRADE ITS EMPHASIS ON THE IDEA.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FRENCH HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN LEADERS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. A FRENCHMAN WAS THE PRINCIPAL DRAFTER OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND, MORE RECENTLY, THE FRENCH WERE ONE OF THE ORIGINATORS OF THE WESTERN INSISTENCE THAT A PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BE INCLUDED IN THE HELSINKI CONFIDENTIAL

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FINAL ACT. THIS ATTACHMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUES TO BE AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF FRENCH POLICY. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH DIFFER FROM US ON THE TACTICS OF HOW BEST TO IMPROVE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. GISCARD'S NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW OF LAST JULY REFLECTS A FRENCH PREFERENCE FOR A MORE MODERATE

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APPROACH WHICH SEEKS TO BRING ABOUT INCREMENTAL CHANGES OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. (FORTUNATELY, GISCARD'S CRITICISM OF THE US IN THAT INTERVIEW HAS NOT REAPPEARED.) THE FRENCH PREFER TO CONVEY WESTERN INTEREST IN SUCH IMPROVEMENTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CREATING A CLIMATE OF EASED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE COMMUNIST REGIMES TO ALTER THEIR PRACTICES. GISCARD NEVERTHELESS
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APPEARS TO FEEL SOME DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, AS BECAME APPARENT WHEN HE FOLLOWED THE APPOINTMENT OF FORMER JUSTICE GOLDBERG TO HEAD OUR BELGRADE DELEGATION BY APPOINTING A FORMER CABINET MINISTER TO LEAD THE FRENCH DELEGATION. THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE FRENCH WILL TAKE A SLIGHTLY MORE FORTH-RIGHT STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN BELGRADE THAN WAS EXPECTED A FEW MONTHS AGO.

12. NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE FRENCH CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO BE AS IMPORTANT AS THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS IS FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THEY BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WILL NOT MAKE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT BEING CONFIDENT THAT THE WEST WILL NOT TRY TO USE INTEREST IN IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS AS A DEVICE FOR UNDERMINING THE COMMUNIST REGIMES. THUS, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, NON-INTERFERENCE IS A NECESSARY COROLLARY TO ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SECOND, THE FRENCH SEE THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERFERENCE AS THE BEST AVAILABLE FOIL TO THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE" AND THUS AS AT LEAST A PARTIAL DETERRENT TO PRAGUE-STYLE INVASIONS AND AS AN ASSET TO THE PROGRESS OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS TOWARD INCREASED INDEPENDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

13. CSCE. THE FRENCH WERE ORIGINALLY SUSPICIOUS OF A CONTINUING CSCE PROCESS, BUT HAVE NOW BECOME CONVINCED THAT THIS IS A DESIRABLE ADDITION TO THE PANOPLY OF EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. THEY SEE THE CSCE AS A POSSIBLY

USEFUL VEHICLE FOR ADVANCING DETENTE, PROVIDED THE
WEST DOES NOT MAKE EXCESSIVE DEMANDS WHICH THE EASTERN
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COUNTRIES CANNOT SATISFY IMMEDIATELY, AND PROVIDED THE
CONFERENCE DOES NOT EVOLVE INTO A CONFRONTATION OR A
US-SOVIET NEGOTIATION, WHICH WOULD CREATE A CONDOMINIUM
AND CONTRADICT THE FRENCH VIEW OF THE CSCE'S PURPOSE.

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14. EASTERN EUROPE. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CAN BE WEANED FROM THE SOVIETS, AND THIS IS A KEY FRENCH OBJECTIVE, BUT THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE THROUGH CAREFUL BILATERAL DIPLOMACY BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT POLICY WHICH CAN SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE EAST EUROPEANS AND JUSTIFY THEIR OWN EVOLUTION IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIETS. U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

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EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION CANNOT, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT SINCE THEY MIGHT APPEAR TO CHALLENGE SOVIET DOMINANCE. THE FRENCH THEREFORE THINK THIS WEANING CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE WEST EUROPEANS, PRIMARILY THE FRENCH THEMSELVES. THE FRENCH SEE THEMSELVES AS HAVING SOMETHING OF A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH EASTERN EUROPE, GOING BACK TO PRE-WORLD WAR II CULTURAL AND DEFENSE TIES WITH INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. DE GAULLE'S FIRST VISIT BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN WAS NOT TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT TO POLAND.

15. CONCLUSIONS. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD RE-IATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES STARTS FROM DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS FROM OUR OWN AND ARRIVES AT SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS, BUT IT LARGELY PARALLELS AND COMPLEMENTS OUR OWN CONCEPTIONS. THOSE DIFFERENCES WHICH DO EXIST, PARTICULARLY UNDER GISCARD, ARE TACTICAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE. THE PRESENT JUNCTURE PRESENTS OPPORTUNITIES FOR IN-FLUENCING THE FRENCH TOWARD POLICIES WHICH ARE STILL MORE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR OWN, GIVEN GISCARD'S RELATIVE FLEXIBILITY AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH US. BUT OUR INFLUENCE ON FRENCH THINKING CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF WE BEAR IN MIND THE LIMITATIONS ON FRENCH ABILITY TO CHANGE WHICH ARE IMPOSED BY BASIC FRENCH ATTITUDES AND BY THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN FRANCE.
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